Introduction
Fuzzy logic { why should we, pure logicians care? Admittedly, for about three decades the eld called \fuzzy logic" has been developed mainly by non-logicians { there was work on fuzzy convectives, but main interest was paid to approximate reasoning, the popular fuzzy IF-THEN rules and their applications, notably to fuzzy control. Even of the famous -bibliography of mathematical logic 19] lists over 400 papers from 1965-85 under the heading \fuzzy logic". Till very recently the majority of logical community were skeptical, mostly due to tho fact that many papers declaring to deal with fuzzy logic were mathematicaly uninteresting. But the question has remained: can there really be a logic of inexact, imprecise, vague propositions? Propositions that may be more true or less true, thus a logic with a comparative notion of truth? In how far does this motivation give a new impulse and inspiration for developing systems of many-valued logic, whose history began in 1920's?
The time seems to be ripe to answer there question { for the bene t of both the pure logicians, nding new insights to formal logic and the developers and users of fuzzy logic (in the broad sense of the word), getting strict mathematical foundations for their activity.
In last few years I have tried hard to contribute to what could be called mathematical fuzzy logic;. My book \Metamathematics of fuzzy logic" 10] is the main outcome. (I note also two discusion papers 18] and 11].) Several rst-class logicians have recently published or are preparing papers on systems of fuzzy logic; and at the Logic Colloquium'98 I had the honour to give a tutorial on fuzzy logic and there was a Special session chaired by D. Mundici) on Manyvalued and fuzzy logic. Thus it seems that presently fuzzy logic has become one of established topics of mathematical logic or, in other words, that the idea of fuzzy logic has lead to a revival of interest in mathematical many-valued logics.
The present paper does not intend to be a written tutorial on fuzzy logic; such a tutorial was published as 15] and a shorter (updated) version is planned to appear in 12]. Here my plan is (1) to o er the reader a sort of self-review of the book 10], summarizing the design choices made, list the formal systems obtained, evaluate the present state of knowledge about them and their use as means of analysis of speci c methods of fuzzy logic, as well as to underline debts and omissions of the book and (2) to survey new results of various authors closely related to the material of the book (thus describing the \state of art" of mathematical fuzzy logic). The list of references should also serve by updating and completing that of 10].
Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic

Choices
The book 10] relies on the following main assumptions:
(1) The ordered real interval 0; 1] is understood as the standard set of truth degrees (truth values). (2) Continuous t-norms are taken to be (standard) truth functions of conjuction; particular interest is payed to the three famous continuous t-norms { Lukasiewicz (max(0; x + y ? 1)); G odel (minimum) and product 1 .
(3) Given a continuous t-norm, its residuum is taken to be the truth-function of implication. (These truth-functions are often called R-implications in the literature on fuzzy logic).
(4) Given such an R-implication ), the truth function of negation (?)x is de ned to be x ) 0 (x implies falsity).
Thus choosing a continuous t-norm one chooses a semantics of propositional calculus { a t-norm logic. Main questions are: what is common to all these logics, and what is the logic of our outstanding t-norms Lukasiewicz, G odel and product logic. For prodicate calculus, we add: (5) A natural generalization of Tarskian semantics is taken to be the (standard) semantics of fuzzy predicate calculus: an interpretation consists of a nonempty (crisp) universe, predicates are interpreted by fuzzy relations and the quanti ers 8; 9 are interpreted by inf and sup respectively. 
Results
To grasp what is to all t-norm logics, a set of 7 t-tautologies (having value 1 for each t-norm and each evaluation of propositional variables) is taken to be axioms of basic (fuzzy) logic BL. With modus ponens as the anly deduction rule some three dozens of formulas are shown to be provable (and hence to be 1?tautologies). The axioms naturaly determine a variety of algebras called BLalgebras. Each algebra can be taken as the algebra of truth functions of connectives (over the set of truth values given by the domain of the algebra). Axioms of BL are sound and strongly complete with respect to this generalized semantics; in particular,`B L ' i ' is a tautology over each BL-algebra (and, in general, for each theory T 
For each of the three outstanding t-norms the following is mode: BL is extended by one or two additional axioms found for the respective t-norm; the resulting systems are t; G; ( Lukasiewicz, G odel and product logic). This gives the corresponding varieties af algebras (MV-algebras, G-algebras, product algebras) and we get strong completeness w.r.t. models over these algebras for free from the strong completeness of BL. What does cost work is standard completeness { with respect to the respective standard algebra with the domain 0; 1] given by the respective t-norm. For G we get full strong standard completeness; for L and only strong standard completeness for nitely axiomatized theories.
For Lukasiewicz logic one obtains a well-behaving extension by rational truth- ' and v. Axioms of C8 are those of C plus ve xed axioms for quanti ers (two usual axiom for 8 from Boolean predicate calculus, their \duals" for 9 and one additional axiom).
The strong completeness says that T`C 8 ' i ' is true in all L-models of T for each C-algebra L. Here M is an L-model of T if M is a safe L-interpretation making all axioms of T true. Strong standard completeness holds for G8 (provable = true to all models over the standard G-algebra). This shows the set TAUT G8 1 (of tautologies of G8) to be 1 and it is easy to show thet it is 1 ?complete. On the other hand, TAUT L8 1 is 2 -complete and TAUT 8 1 is 2 -hard (TAUT L8 1 is reducible to TAUT 
Debts and omissions
Needless to say, the above is a selection of topics and approaches; even if I belive to have covered main central topics. I feel obliged to mention important things not covered. (Some of then are least mentioned in the book.)
On the one land, there has been extensive research in \classical" many-valued logic, namely in Lukasiewicz propositional logic and MV-algebras (Mundici's school) and in G odel logic (both propositional and predicate logic, Baaz's school) that could not be included. Second, from the point of view of traditional fuzzy logic our choice (4) can be questioned: independently of the choice of the truth functions of conjunction and implication one usualy insists on having Lukasiewicz negation (1?x) (present in L but absent in G, ). Having this (involutive) negation one can use de Morgan rule to introduce a dual of the starting conjunction { the corresponding disjunction. (Note that in each t-norm logic we do have a disjunction whose truth function is maximum and also we do have the mindisjunction.) Further, in traditional fuzzy logic one sometimes uses so-called S-implications. They are not elaborated in the book (but in 9.4.6, reference is given to the corresponding literature).
We shall go into more details in the next section. 34] has the title \Ulam games, the logic of MAXSAT, and many-valued partitions". MAXSAT is the problem whether a set of boolean clauses contains a satisfable subset of cardinality ot least k. (MAXSAT is known to be NP-complete.) The authors present a polynomial-time reduction of MAXSAT to the set SAT 1 of satisfable formulas of L for which the image (') of a set (C 1 ; : : : ; C m ; k) has a natural interpretation related to Ulam games with lies (errors); in the nal section these games are brie y related to partitions in MV-algebras. Note that both the relation of Ulam games to L and partitions in MV-algebras are topics that have been detailedly studied in Mundici's previous papers. The corresponding material and references may be found in 28]. Partitions of MV-algebras are also used in 35] for a study of imprecisely de ned functions. This paper contains a nice Appendix giving a survey on MV-algebras, their partitions and Lukasiewicz propositional logic.
G odel (and other) logics
Here I refer on some results of the Vienna school of M. Baaz. I shall disregard results of this group concerning nitely-valued logics; in the domain of in nitevalued logics studied by them G odel logic plays a central role. In fact they investigate di erent G odel logics, each given by a complete sublattice V of 0; 1]; important examples being V 0 = f0g f 1 k ; k > 0g and V 1 = f1g f1 ? 1 k jk > 0g:
Whereas all in nite V give the same set of propositional tautologies, they give many di erent propositional logics with respect to entailment: a set of formulas entails a formula ' if each evaluation of variables making all members of true makes also ' true. This is studied in 5]; the authors show that between the logic G " with the truth set V 1 and the logic G (with 0,1]) there are in nitely many intermediate logics with pairwise di erent entailmemt relations. In the same paper the authors prove that logic over an in nite V is compact i V contains a non-trivial densely ordered subset (in which case its entailment coincides with the entailment of G).
In 4] it is shown, among other things, that G odel propositional logic G has interpolation (even uniform) but neither L nor has interpolation. Extensions of these logics by Baaz's connective 4 and some other unary connectives are studied from the point of view of interpolation (There are many other results in this paper.)
In 3] G odel predicate logics over di erent truth sets are studied and it is shown that, in contradistinction to G8, the predicate logic G # 8 over V 0 is not recursively completely axiomatizable. Finally we mention 1]; from many results of this paper we note that the axiom (A4) of BL (commutativity of the minconjunction) is not redundant (does not follow from the others; this was once asked by me as a problem. The situation is fully analogous to that of satisfability/tautologicity in propositional logic).
Enriched systems
Recall that for Lukasiewicz logic the truth function n(x) of negation is 1 ? x, which is a particular involution (n(n(x)) = x for all x); but if a logic is given by a t-norm without non-trivial zero divisors (as G odel and product logic) then its n(x) is G odel negation (n(0) = 1; n(x) = 0 for x > 0):
In 8] (by Esteva, Godo, H jek and Navara) one studies rst an extension SBL of BL by an axiom sound for all t-norms without non-trivial zero divisors; then this system is expanded by a new negation and axiom expressing the fact that the truth function of the new negation os involutive. Completeness of axioms of this (propositional) system SBL with respect to the corresponding variety of algebras is proved in the standard manner. Adding axioms for speci c t-norms we get G and { G odel and product logic with involutive negation. We have the standard G -algebra and standard -algebra (which is the standard G-algebra or -algebra over 0; 1] expanded by the operation 1 ? x) and may ask if we have standard completeness. For G the answer is positive, for not, but for we get semi-standard completeness { completeness with respect to expansions of the standard -algebra by any involutive negation (not necessary 1 ? x). The theory extends to predicate calculi SBL8 , L8 , G8 , 8 : we get strong completeness w.r.t. safe models over the corresponding algebras and for G8 we get even strong standard completeness.
Esteva, Godo and Montagna are preparing a joint paper 9] in which they present a ( nitary) complete axiomatization of a logic having both Lukasiewicz and product conjunction and both Lukasiewicz and product implication (in which case the logic de nes also G odel conjunction and implication). They nd a very elegant representation of the underlying L -algebras using ordered elds and prove also the corresponding standard completeness theorem. 10] . I hope the reader will agree that the eld of mathematical fuzzy logic is presently sound, lively and promising, worth to be studied and developed.
